the commercial practice restrictions imposed on optometrists are increasingly being perceived as a means to serve some optometrists' selfinterests rather than the "public interest." The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has argued that state restrictions on employment, location, branch offices, and trade names serve some optometrists' self-interests by restricting the growth of high-volume, chain vision-care outlets.3 Further restrictions on optometrists' advertising have been shown to increase the price of ophthalmic goods and services4 and to increase price without increasing quality.5
While a large body of empirical evidence exists on the effect of advertising restrictions, little empirical evidence exists on the effects of other commercial practice restrictions, such as the employment, location, branch office, and trade name restrictions. Benham and Benham and the FTC estimated the effect of the degree of professional control;6 however, neither study measured professional control on the basis of the extent of state commercial practice restrictions. Benham and Benham measured professional control as (1) the proportion of optometrists within each state belonging to the American Optometric Association (AOA), (2) the market share of large chain optical firms, and (3) the assessment of five representatives of large chain optical firms of the "difficulty which a commercial firm has entering and operating in a state for reasons other than competition with existing commercial firms."7 The FTC measured professional control as the presence or absence of chain optical firms employing optometrists and as the type of media advertising observed in the area.8
Both the Benhams' and the FTC's studies are subject to the problem of Schmalensee Accordingly, after a brief description of the market for ophthalmic goods and services and an analysis of the commercial practice restrictions, this paper presents an econometric study of the economic effect of the employment, location, branch office, and trade name restrictions. In particular, the effects of these restrictions on the price and quality of eye examinations and eyeglasses provided by optometrists are analyzed in markets characterized by different levels of consumer information and entry barriers. Further, this research provides a preliminary test of a recent amendment to the economic theory of regulation-that the regulatory process can be used as a strategic weapon by subgroups of firms within an industry against other subgroups within that industry.
II. THE MARKET FOR OPHTHALMIC GOODS AND SERVICES
Most optometrists are self-employed; however, the market share of layemployed optometrists (optometrists employed by drug and department stores and other nonprofessional optical firms) is increasing. In 1977, 80 " This is due in part to the difference between the FTC's classification criteria, the presence of optical firms employing optometrists, and Pearle Health Service's marketing strategy. "The Companies' marketing strategy is premised upon the availability of optometric services at or near the location of the retail optical store. ... In nine states of the United States, the Company employs optometrists to provide eye examinations and related services. In most other jurisdictions in which the Company operates stores, the Company leases space adjacent to the retail optical store to an optometrist who provides these services." Pearle Health Services, Inc., Prospectus, 11-13 (September 16, 1983).
12 Certain state optometric associations' rules of practice and codes of ethics also suggest ways to establish and maintain one's practice; however, the private association's only enforcement mechanism is expulsion from membership. Many optometrists choose not to belong in the first place. 13 The commercial practice restriction data were obtained from the Restrictions on location usually provide that it is unprofessional conduct or an illegal practice to work in an office not devoted exclusively to the practice of optometry or some other health care profession or in which materials are displayed pertaining to a commercial undertaking not related to the practice of optometry. Trade name restrictions usually provide that an optometrist's license to practice may be revoked or suspended for practicing under a name other than his or her own name or under a false or assumed name. However, trade name restrictions generally do not prevent an optometrist from working for another optometrist and holding him or herself out under the name of the professional corporation. Thus, these restrictions have a distinct discriminatory impact on non-professional corporations. (The discriminatory impact here is not that a professional corporation is able to use a traditional trade name but rather that an individual optometrist can hold him or herself out under a firm name which does not contain his or her individual name so long as that firm is a professional corporation or the name of a licensed optometrist who employs that individual optometrist.)20
The existence of commercial practice restrictions in the market for ophthalmic services is consistent with the economic theory of regulation and with recent literature on strategic use of the regulatory process by subgroups of firms within an industry. According to the economic theory of regulation, regulation can be used as a device for transferring income from groups with less political power to groups with more, usually from consumers to the politically powerful regulated industry.21 Firms in the regulated industry are assumed to be homogeneous and therefore equally benefited by the regulation and equally interested in promoting the regulation.
Recently, the economic theory of regulation has been extended to include heterogeneous firms and thus the idea that regulations impose different benefits and costs on firms within the industry. device for transferring income from subgroups of firms with less political power to those with more. Politically powerful firms can use the regulatory process as a strategic weapon against other groups of firms within the industry. Oster wrote, "As long as there is some initial difference among firms in an industry, different firms in that industry may push for regulations which increase the relative rate of return to their peculiar characteristics. ... [T]he firm may even encourage a regulation which lowers its short-term profits if that regulation simultaneously reduces the ability of its rival to compete effectively."24
Salop and Scheffman make a more general argument and mention regulation as one way to increase rivals' costs: "It is better to compete against high-cost firms than low-cost ones. Thus, raising rivals' costs can be profitable even if the rival does not exit from the market. ... A highercost rival quickly reduces output, allowing the predator to immediately raise price or market share."25 Strategic use of the regulatory process is quite possible in the ophthalmic industry. Optometrists regulate themselves,26 and the optometrists appointed to the state regulatory boards are not appointed at random. Board members in forty-six states are appointed by the governor from lists of optometrists who have practiced optometry in the state for a specified number of years. In sixteen states, the optometry statutes designate membership in the state optometric association as a prerequisite for appointment, or they require the governor to make appointments from lists submitted by the state optometric association.27 Further, the industry consists of differentiated subgroups of firms. Size, marketing strategy, and level of vertical integration differentiate self-employed optometrists from lay-employed optometrists.
IV. THE ECONOMIC EFFECT OF COMMERCIAL PRACTICE RESTRICTIONS
The employment restriction prevents nonprofessional optical firms from employing optometrists and therefore from selling eye examinations and eyeglass prescriptions (that is, offering the one-stop service of dis- 24 Oster, supra note 22, at 606. 25 pensing optometrists). To the extent that there are economies of scope in the joint production of eye examinations and eyeglasses, the employment restriction forces nonprofessional optical firms to incur the higher cost of producing eyeglasses alone. Thus the employment restriction may deter entry by potential nonprofessional optical firms. However, the employment restriction does not prevent the nonprofessional firm from locating close to an optometrist.
The trade name restriction prevents lay-employed optometrists from including trade names in their advertising. Since consumers can use trade names as a substitute for search or as an aid in processing information about different sellers, the trade name restriction decreases the effectiveness of advertising by nonprofessional optical firms. This may reduce the ability of nonprofessional optical firms to attract new customers and realize scale economies. Like the employment restriction, the trade name restriction may also deter entry by potential nonprofessional optical firms.
The location restriction prevents self-employed and lay-employed optometrists from locating in high-traffic, high-visibility areas such as shopping centers and department stores. This reduces the ability of all optometrists to develop high-volume practices and realize economies of scale. Lay-employed optometrists, however, tend to rely more heavily than self-employed optometrists on convenient locations to attract customers.28 Therefore, lay-employed optometrists are more likely to be constrained by the location restriction.
The branch office restriction prevents self-employed and lay-employed optometrists from expanding their practices by opening new offices. To the extent the branch office regulation is binding, optometrists are prevented from utilizing the cost-minimizing combination of inputs. With data from the dental industry, DeVany, Gramm, Saving, and Smithson29 show that input regulation increases the ratio of unrestricted to restricted inputs.
The preceding discussion focuses on the commercial practice restrictions' effects on self-and lay-employed optometrists' production costs. Two of the four restrictions, the employment and trade name restrictions, may increase the costs of production for lay-employed optometrists. The location and branch office restrictions may increase the costs of production for self-employed and lay-employed optometrists; however, it can be argued that the location and branch office restrictions differentially damage lay-employed optometrists. In addition, the analysis suggests that the restrictions may deter entry by nonprofessional optical firms.30 The expected result, if this is true, is higher prices.
The hypothesis to be tested, then, is that the commercial practice restrictions have tended to increase eye examination and eyeglass prices. However, the major justification for the restrictions is elimination of lowquality services. Accordingly, the empirical analysis also examines the effect of the restrictions on quality. A hedonic regression is estimated to test the effects of the restrictions on quality-adjusted price. The qualityadjusted price is defined as the price of an eye examination and pair of eyeglasses of a given quality and is revealed to consumers from observed prices of eye examinations and eyeglasses and the level of quality associated with them.
V. THE MODEL
When information is costly, the relevant market structure is monopolistic competition rather than perfect competition.31 Accordingly, the ophthalmic industry is modeled as a monopolistically competitive industry.32
Assuming optometrists choose price and quality jointly, the qualityadjusted price, QUALP/, charged by optometrist j is a function of optometrist j's marginal cost, MCJ, and price elasticity of demand, e,: 
QUALPj = f[MCi(INPUT, R-EMPLOY, R-LOCATE, R-BRANCH, R-TN), ej(Aj, AD, OPTOM)], where INPUT is the price of inputs, R-EMPLOY is the employment restriction, R-LOCATE is the location restriction, R-BRANCH is the branch office restriction, R-TN is the trade name restriction, A, is the 3) Support for this suggestion is found in the Prospectus
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During the training period, the interviewers were also given eye examinations so there would be independent opinions regarding the corrective lenses each subject required for proper vision. With respect to the other independent variables, EXAM is measured as the number of subject areas that must be included in the state licensing examination, INPUT is measured as the average SMSA wage rate of production workers in the manufacturing sector, and OPTIC is measured as the ratio of opticians to 100,000 population in the state.
VII. THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Equation (4) is estimated in double-log form using two specifications and two dependent variables. The results of regressions on price are reported in Table 4 , while the results of regressions on quality are reported in Table 5 . In the first specification the four commercial practice restrictions are included as dummy variables that equal one if the restriction is present in the state and zero otherwise. In the second specification the restrictions are included as dummy variables, and an index of the degree of state regulation of optometry, REG, is interacted with quality and media advertising. The variable REG is constructed by summing the dummy commercial practice restriction variables by state. This summated scale assigns equal weight to each restriction and ranges from zero to four. Thus the potential interaction between quality choice and the restrictions and the interaction between media advertising and regulatory effect are included in the second specification.46
46
Advertising may permit the realization of production scale economies that might otherwise be unobtainable because of market imperfections or regulation. Because of the collinearity among the commercial practice restrictions,47 the individual coefficients cannot be estimated precisely; however, the sum of the coefficients on the regulatory variables can be estimated with considerable accuracy. This sum provides a reliable estimate of the regulatory effect.48 47 High zero-order correlations are a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the existence of multicollinearity. The trade name restriction is highly correlated with the location, the branch office, and the employment restrictions (r = 0.82, 0.52, and 0.54, respectively).
48 See Maddala, supra note 41, at 189. Results of ordinary least squares regressions that test the effects of the restrictions on price, controlling for differences in quality, are reported in Table 4 . The coefficients on the dummy variables can be interpreted as percentage changes and those on the other variables as elasticities. Regression A and regressions C-E include one measure of quality, THOR-OUGH, while regression B includes two quality measures, THOROUGH and ACPRESC. Further, regression C allows for an interaction between the degree of state regulation of optometry and media advertising by optometrists; regression D allows for an interaction between the degree of state regulation of optometry and optometrists' quality decisions; and regression E allows for both interactions.
The results are consistent with the hypothesis that state commercial practice restrictions increase the price of ophthalmic goods and services, holding quality constant. The sum of the coefficients on the regulatory variables in regression A suggests a positive 5.5 percent difference in the price of an eye examination and pair of eyeglasses in fully regulated versus nonregulated states. Similarly, the summed coefficients for regres- sions B-E resulted in positive 13.1, 7.3, 5.1, and 7.0 percent differences, respectively, in fully regulated states. In all five regressions the hypothesis that the effect of the commercial practice regulations is equal to zero can be rejected at the 1 percent level of significance (F = 8.14, 7.52,  11.18, 8.33, and 11.50, respectively) .
With respect to the relationship between price and quality, the price of an eye examination and a pair of eyeglasses increases with the thoroughness of the eye examination but not with the accuracy of the eyeglass prescription. A 1 percent increase in the thoroughness of the eye examination results in a 0.11-0.12 percent increase in the price of an eye examination and pair of eyeglasses. The coefficient on ACPRESC, however, is not significantly different from zero. This suggests that prices convey information on one aspect of product quality, thoroughness of the examination, but prices do not convey information on a second aspect of quality, prescription accuracy. A possible explanation of this is that consumers can assess thoroughness but not prescription accuracy.
In all five regressions media advertising by optometrists is associated with lower prices, controlling for quality differences. Prices are approximately 26.3-33.1 percent lower in markets in which price or nonprice media advertising by optometrists is observed. This is consistent with the FTC's finding that the average price charged for eyeglasses and eye examinations is $23.74 lower in markets in which price advertising and chain optical firms are observed.49 The coefficient on the optician-to-population ratio is also negative and statistically significant in all regressions. Further, in all five regressions more rigorous licensing examinations, higher per capita income, and higher input costs are associated with higher prices, controlling for quality differences. For example, a 1 percent increase in the number of subject areas that must be covered in the state licensing examination results in a 0.17-0.37 percent increase in price. Table 5 reports the results of ordinary least squares regressions that test the effects of the commercial practice restrictions on quality, measured as the thoroughness of the eye examination. The results suggest that quality is not affected by the presence of the commercial practice restrictions. In the first quality regression the sum of the coefficients of the commercial practice restrictions is -17.8 percent, which is not significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level (F = 2.04). The summed coefficients of the commercial practice restrictions in the second quality regression equal -14.6 percent, again not statistically significant at the 1 percent level (F = 2.29). The results do not support the argument made by propo-nents of the commercial practice restrictions that the restrictions will increase the quality of ophthalmic services.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In 1977 the four commercial practice restrictions appear to have increased the price of an eye examination and pair of eyeglasses by at least 5-13 percent, holding quality constant, measured as the thoroughness of the eye examination and accuracy of the eyeglass prescription. And to reiterate, the commercial practice restrictions did not appear to increase the quality of ophthalmic services. These results provide support for the economic theory of regulation and for a recent extension of the economic theory of regulation, that subgroups of firms within an industry will use the regulatory process to increase their rivals' costs and, therefore, their own market power.
Consumers paid at least $4.7 million more for eye examinations and eyeglasses in 1977 because of the four commercial practice restrictions.50 Further, part of this $4.7 million is a social cost rather than an income transfer. Regulation-induced inefficiencies in production account for some of the price increase. The four commercial practice restrictions may inhibit optometrists' potential to realize economies of scale, the employment restriction may inhibit nonprofessional optical firms' potential to realize economies of scope, and the branch office restriction may prevent optometrists from employing the cost-minimizing combination of inputs. Also the opportunity costs of resources used by optometrists to influence the political process to attain market power through commercial practice laws and regulations are social costs.51 This paper suggests that commercial practice restrictions in the ophthalmic market are not protecting the consumer. The commercial practice restrictions increase price and have a statistically insignificant effect on quality. Intervention strategies should correct the market failure without causing serious distortions that lead to even greater consumer injury. 
